Many financial institutions employ outside portfolio managers to manage part or all of their investable assets. These institutions include pension funds, private endowments (e.g., colleges and charities), and private trusts. Pension funds are the largest and most likely organizations to employ several outside managers, each of whom manages a part of the overall portfolio. In this paper we will use the pension fund manager as the prototype of the centralized decision-maker trying to optimally manage a set of decentralized decision-makers but the analysts is general.
If the centralized decision-maker (CDM) is a mean variance maximizer, the CDM could construct a portfolio using standard portfolio theory and estimates of mean return, variances, and covariances between the portfolios constructed by a group of decentralized managers. However, this overall portfolio is unlikely to be optimum since the individually managed portfolios themselves were constructed without taking into account the portfolios of the other managers. The purpose of this article is to set up a structure that leads to the optimum portfolio from the viewpoint of the CDM when there are multiple managers and their portfolios are constructed without reference to each other.
In the first section we will present a more detailed discussion of the problem. We will then solve the problem for one active manager and multiple passive managers. The model is then generalized to multiple active managers. Next, we present solutions under a simplified structure of the return-generating process. Finally, we discuss the complications when short sales are not allowed.
I. Background
In this section we discuss some background material on the pension investment problem and review the relevant literature. The same considerations hold for private endowments and trusts. Most pension plans are managed by a centralized decision maker at a firm. Most firms have one person who is principally in charge, although the ultimate responsibility rests with a committee, usually the board. This CDM normally employs outside portfolio managers to construct active portfolios. Index funds are generic products and we will assume the centralized decision maker can potentially select one or more of these. The centralized decision maker's task is fourfold: 1) decide how much to invest in each portfolio, 2) give the outside managers instructions that will result in their making optimum allocations from the point of view of the overall plan, 3) design incentive systems so that the managers will behave optimally, and 4) evaluate and select the portfolio managers. In this paper we deal only with the first two of these problems.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the portfolio managers will not provide the centralized decision maker with their return forecasts for individual securities, but will provide aggregate information about the portfolios they hold.
Aspects of this problem have previously been addressed by Treynor and Black (1974) and Sharpe (1981) . The Treynor Black article discussed the active passive split when the CAPM described the returns on the passive portfolio, short sales are allowed and the single-index model describes the return generating process. Sharpe develops, with one active and one passive manager, the instructions for the active manager that will result in the active manager producing a globally optimal portfolio. He assumes short sales are allowed and the variance covariance matrix is agreed on by all parties. He also solves for the instructions to be given to the managers that results in a global optimal for the case of two managers following exactly the same set of securities where the centralized decision maker believes the best forecast of a securities alpha is a weighted average of the two managers alphas and where these weights add to one. In solving this problem he maintains the assumption of short sales allowed and agreement on the variance covariance matrix. Sharpe (1981) could not obtain an exact myopic solution for the case of non-overlapping securities. Our analysis differs from Sharpe (1981) in that we generalize to N managers, have no requirement that they hold the same securities and by employing a multi-factor model can arrive at simple rules for forming myopic optimum portfolios and understanding the weight placed on each security in that portfolio.
II. Separation with a single active and multiple passive manager
In this section of the paper we will assume that a centralized decision maker (CDM)
exists who hires a single active manager. We will shortly expand the case to several active managers. We will assume the following: 1) the CDM is a mean variance decision maker, 2) the CDM believes a multi-index model describes the return structure for securities and all indexes in the multi-index model are tradable.
The second point requires some clarification. The CDM believes that returns can be described as being generated by a set of indexes (not necessarily orthogonal) that the CDM can take positions in as passive portfolios. For example, this is consistent with a belief that the return on securities is a function of the market return, the return on a portfolio of small stocks, and/or the return on a portfolio of value or growth stocks. The CDM wishes to consider these sources of risk in making the optimum mean variance decision. For expositional reasons we will analyze the CDM's problem with a two index model though the solution easily generalizes to any number of indexes.
A. The CDM's problem
We start by examining the optimum decision the CDM would make if the CDM had all the information that is available to the active managers. As mentioned earlier, we believe the CDM would not be able to obtain risk adjusted return forecasts for individual securities from the active manager, but for the moment we examine the optimum decision as if the CDM has such information. We will also assume that the CDM does not have perfect faith in the return forecasts of the active manager. This implies that the CDM will take positions in the passive portfolios for two reasons, to obtain diversification across securities so that the portfolio is mean variance efficient, and to eliminate some of the lack of reliability in the analyst's estimates.
In order to specify the return generating process, define Then the return generating process is
Assume that the CDM had access to the excess return forecasts ) ( i α of the active manager. Furthermore, assume the CDM believes that the best estimate of risk-adjusted excess return is an average of the analysts' forecasts and the value that would occur in equilibrium namely zero. Thus, we define the excess risk adjusted return that the CDM would use as
where W is set by CDM between 0 and 1.
To solve this problem and assuming short sales, the CDM can use the standard first order conditions. The investments that can be selected are the N individual securities and the two indexes. The first order condition for security i is
Where 1. N is the number of securities entering into the decision making process 2.
D i
Z is a number proportional to the optimal weight which the CDM would place in security i
3.
A, B designate passive portfolios.
If the return generating process described in equation (1) is an accurate description of returns and we recognize that the indexes need not be orthogonal, then we can define the variance and covariance between individual securities as Employing these relationships with the first order condition (2), we get for security i 
Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (3) and simplifying, we get
The fraction of the funds the CDM would invest in any security if he or she had full information is Z shortly. They will be solved for by analyzing the problem as an allocation of funds across two passive and an optimum active portfolio. However, to solve for the optimum amount in security i we consider the active portfolio denoted by P as a separate portfolio and look at the optimum composition of this portfolio before we allocate across all three portfolios. We can treat the design of P as a separate portfolio because from equation (6),
The amount to invest in security i in the optimal active portfolio from the viewpoint of the CDM is simply 
B.
Optimum active portfolio
The CDM can ensure that the active manager will hold the optimal active portfolio from the point of view of the CDM simply by instructing the active manager to rank all stocks by 2 ei i σ α and to hold them in that proportion. 1 This simple instruction ensures that the active manager will turn over to the CDM the same active portfolio that
1 If the decentralized manager were simply told to form the optimum active portfolio assuming that he could hold the passive portfolio, he would get the same result as following the direction from the central manager.
the CDM would hold if all the security estimates were supplied directly to the CDM.
Optimization for the active portfolio is reached without the active manager giving up private information.
Of course the CDM still has the problem of deciding what fraction of funds to place in the active portfolio and each of the passive portfolios.
C. Solving the aggregate allocation problem
Denote the characteristics of the active portfolio by the subscript P. Then from the viewpoint of the CDM, ignoring for the moment any difficulty of getting information, the problem can be formulated and solved using the following first order conditions.
These are standard first order conditions, and if everything but the Z's are known the optimum solution can be reached by solving three simultaneous equations or by using any one of a number of standard software packages. To obtain these estimates, the CDM needs to request the active manager's estimate of the alpha for the active portfolio, the residual risk of the active portfolio and the active portfolio sensitivities to the two indexes. These are the types of estimates the active manager should be willing to supply since they are aggregate portfolio values rather than individual security values.
2 The CDM needs to estimate the expected return above the riskless note and risk on the index funds, the covariance between the passive funds, and the amount of weight (W) to put on the active manager's estimates.
We have now presented a set of conditions under which a centralized decisionmaker can optimize portfolio composition while employing one active manager. The next problem to solve is the case of several active, decentralized managers.
III. Multiple active managers
The analysis generalizes to multiple active managers whether these managers follow some or all securities in common or follow independent sections of the market. Summing both sides of equation (8) 
Taking the ratio of (10) and (11) 
Rearranging and substituting equation (12) 
Having developed these expressions, we can now show that there exists an allocation across the active portfolios along with the instruction to the individual managers to hold stocks in proportion 2 ei i σ α , which results in an overall optimum to the CDM.
Substituting equation (12) into (9) 
Recall that the individual portfolio manager has been instructed to form a portfolio by holding securities proportional to the ratio of excess return to residual risk.
Recognizing this instruction and using equation (12) 
Utilizing equation (8) and dividing both sides of equation (8) In addition, the CDM can determine the split between the aggregate active portfolio and the passive portfolios using any standard portfolio algorithm by solving the portfolio problem using the 2 and , , , eP PB PA α β β α from each manager and estimating the weights, the excess return, risk of the passive funds, and the covariance between passive funds centrally. This is done using the overall active portfolio and two passive portfolios using the equations in Section II C.
IV.

Orthogonal Indexes
Up to this point we have assumed that the indexes are not orthogonal. The advantage of this is that it allows the passive portfolios to be portfolios that exist in the market such as small stocks, the S&P Index, growth stocks, etc. However, if we are willing to assume orthogonal indexes the allocation across active and passive managers is 
VI. Conclusion
In this article we have shown that under realistic conditions when short sales are allowed, it is possible, and indeed quite easy, for a centralized decision maker to form an optimal overall portfolio while employing multiple outside portfolio managers. Outside managers should be willing to supply the information the CDM needs since it does not require them to reveal private information on individual securities. Managers should be hesitant to reveal information on individual securities, since it is useful for multiple portfolios and to reveal it opens up the possibility of resale of the information.
Unfortunately, a general solution does not exist when short sales are not allowed.
This is a problem ignored in the past literature. While we cannot present a general optimum model when short sales are not allowed, we have pointed out conditions under which the models we developed for decentralized management holds when short sales are not allowed. If there is a single active manager to combine with passive indexes, a solution exists if it is optimum for the manager to place some funds in each index and/or the indexes (as opposed to the securities) can be sold short. If the indexes cannot be sold short, a solution still exists as long as one and only one index is not held long.
In the case of multiple active managers, the analysis in the previous paragraph holds as long as a forecast of a negative alpha by a manager is taken to convey no information and the manager is simply told not to hold securities with negative alpha.
